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Abstract. The concept of grouping proofs has been introduced by Juels
to permit RFID tags to generate a verifiable proof that they have been
scanned simultaneously, even when readers or tags are potentially un-
trusted. In this paper, we extend this concept and propose a narrow-
strong privacy-preserving RFID grouping proof and demonstrate that it
can easily be extended to use cases with more than two tags, without
any additional cost for an RFID tag. Our protocols rely exclusively on
the use of Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). To illustrate the imple-
mentation feasibility of our proposed solutions, we present a novel ECC
hardware architecture designed for RFID.
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1 Introduction
The concept of RFID grouping proofs, also denoted by yoking proofs, was in-
troduced by Juels [1]. The motivation comes from any application that requires
the proof that two or more entities are present. For example, there could be a
legal requirement that certain medication should be distributed together with
a brochure describing its side-effects. A technical solution to this problem is to
attach RFID tags to both the medication and the brochures, and create group-
ing proofs when they are scanned simultaneously. The pharmacist then stores
these grouping proofs as evidence, to transmit them to the government for veri-
fication. Other use cases include monitoring of groups of hardware components
that needs to be shipped together, coupling a physical person via his passport
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to his boarding pass, or – in the military context – only enabling weaponry or
equipment when an appropriate group of entities is present.
Recently, other work proposed in the literature improved the computational
complexity of Juels’ protocol, and considered other requirements such as privacy
and forward security. The common property for all the schemes proposed so far is
the use of symmetric-key primitives. Such schemes are however often not scalable,
and entail several security (e.g., cloning attacks) and/or privacy problems (e.g.,
it is proven that one needs public-key cryptography to achieve a certain level
of privacy protection [6]). In contrast to this, the privacy-preserving grouping-
proof protocols we propose in this paper rely exclusively on the use of public-
key cryptography. More in particular, they are founded on the ECC-based ID-
transfer protocol proposed by Lee et al. [2], as this scheme entails interesting
security and privacy properties.
This paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2 we describe our assumptions
and adversary model. Our grouping-proof protocol is given in Sect. 3. A novel
architecture for an ECC processor suitable for RFID is outlined in Sect. 4. We
conclude our work in Sect. 5.
2 Assumptions and adversary model
In our setting, there are three distinct parties involved: the set of tags, the reader,
and a trusted verifier. The former two will engage in a protocol run, which results
in the construction of the grouping proof. This proof is then verifiable (offline)
by the trusted verifier.
Due to the “simultaneously scanned” requirement, the notion of time is very
important as already pointed out by Juels [1]. We assume that both the reader
and the tags measure the round-trip-time during the execution of the protocol.
If this round-trip-time exceeds a particular threshold, the protocol is aborted
and the proof remains incomplete. Note that due to these timeouts, the protocol
will always terminate.
We assume that the verifier is trusted and the public-key Y of the verifier is
a publicly known system parameter. Only the verifier knows the corresponding
private-key y. Knowledge of y is a necessary requirement to check the correctness
of a grouping proof. The result of a verification claim is failure, or it reveals the
identities of the involved tags. In this case the verifier stores and timestamps
the grouping proof (enabling temporal ordering of the proofs). The task of the
reader is to coordinate the execution of the protocol, collect the grouping proof
and forward it to the verifier. The reader is not necessarily trusted by the tags
or the verifier.
It should be impossible to generate a valid grouping proof without the in-
volved tags actually participating in the protocol. Without loss of generality,
we assume that there are only two participating tags. To avoid impersonation
attacks or fake grouping proofs, one needs to prevent the following potential
attack scenarios:
Compromised tag: One tag is compromised, the reader is non-compromised.
Man-in-the-middle attack: The reader is compromised (the tags are honest).
Colluding reader and tag: The reader and one of the tags are compromised.
Colluding tags: The reader is non-compromised, both tags are compromised.
The tags can exchange some messages in advance (e.g., via another reader),
but do not know each other’s private key.
Replay attack performed by an outsider: An eavesdropper scans two non-
compromised tags simultaneously and replays the copied message-flow to
impersonate the two tags.
Note that if all tags and the reader are compromised, this enables the ad-
versary to generate valid grouping proofs without simultaneously scanning the
tags. We also do not consider the attack where an adversarial reader scans two
non-compromised tags, and forwards the grouping proof at a later time to the
verifier (i.e. to have an incorrect timestamp being added to the grouping proof).
Note that the grouping proofs that are proposed in this paper, do not prove that
the tags are located in physical proximity to one another. An adversary can use
multiple readers, and forward messages between these devices, to simultaneously
scan tags at remote locations. Besides the large effort and cost, the effect of this
attack is limited due to the timeout mechanism.
In the design of our protocol, we also want to achieve untraceability, in which
the (in)equality of two tags must be impossible to determine. Only the trusted
verifier should be able to check a grouping proof. To evaluate the privacy of
our scheme, we adopt the adversarial capabilities from the framework of Vaude-
nay [6].
3 ECC-based grouping-proof protocol with colluding tag
prevention
3.1 Notation
Let us first introduce the notation used in this work. We denote P as the base
point on a Elliptic Curve, and y and Y (= yP ) are the trusted verifier’s private-
key and public-key pair, where yP denotes the point derived by the point mul-
tiplication operation on the Elliptic Curve group. We use the notation x(T ) to
denote the x-coordinate of the point T on the elliptic curve, and r˙s to denote
the non-linear mapping x(rsP ), with P the base point of the elliptic curve. The
values st and St(= stP ) are tag t’s private-key and public-key.
3.2 Protocol description
In this section, we propose a privacy-preserving ECC-based grouping-proof pro-
tocol with colluding tag prevention (denoted by CTP). It allows a pair of RFID
tags (denoted by tag A and B) to prove that they have been scanned simulta-
neously.
The two-party CTP protocol is shown in Fig. 1. During the entire execution
of the protocol, the tags and/or the reader abort when a timeout occurs, or
Fig. 1. Two-party grouping-proof protocol with colluding tag prevention (CTP).
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when they receive the EC point at infinity. The protocol works as follows. The
reader first sends the messages “start left” and “start right” to indicate the role
of the tags in the protocol. Next, tag A generates a random number ra and the
corresponding EC point Ta,1. Tag B carries out similar operations. Both tags also
compute a response. The response Tb,2 depends on the private-key sb, the random
number rb, the x-coordinate of the challenge Ta,1, and a random challenge rs
generated by the reader. The response Ta,2 depends on the private-key sa, the
random number ra, and the x-coordinate of the challenge Tb,2. The grouping
proof, collected by the reader, consists of the tuple (Ta,1, Ta,2, rs, Tb,1, Tb,2).
To verify the grouping proof constructed by tag A and B, the verifier first
checks that the proof was not used before (to detect replay attacks) and then
performs the following computations:saP = (y
−1Ta,2−Ta,1)x(Tb,2)
−1 and sbP =
(y−1Tb,2−Tb,1)x(rsTa,1)
−1. If the public keys of A and B (Sa and Sb respectively)
are registered in the database of the verifier, the grouping proof is accepted and
a timestamp is added.
3.3 Extension to n > 2 parties
The two-party CTP grouping-proof protocol shown in Fig. 1 can be easily ex-
tended to multiple tags (n > 2). The output of each tag is then used as input for
the “next” tag in the chain, as shown in Fig. 2. This procedure is repeated until
all tags are scanned. The last tag in the chain (denoted by tag Z) sends Tz,2
to tag A, which then computes its response Ta,2. The grouping proof consists
of the following tuple: (Ta,1, Ta,2, . . . , Ti,1, Ti,2, . . . , Tz,1, Tz,2). To check the cor-
rectness of the grouping proof, the verifier performs similar operations as with
the two-party CTP grouping-proof protocol.
Ta,1 Tb,2 T·,2
Tz,2
A B · · · Z
Ta,2
Fig. 2. Chain of grouping proofs.
3.4 Analysis
Due to its construction, our CTP grouping-proof protocol inherits the security
properties of the ID-transfer protocol [2]. The latter is designed to provide secure
entity authentication in the setting of an active adversary, and can be shown to
be equivalent to the Schnorr protocol [5] regarding impersonation resistance.
One can demonstrate that to impersonate a tag in either of our attack scenarios,
the adversary needs to know the private-key of that particular tag (or be able
to solve the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem).
The same argumentation as above can be used to demonstrate the privacy
properties of the CTP grouping-proof protocol. Since the ID-transfer protocol
offers privacy protection against a narrow-strong adversary, untraceability can
even be guaranteed if the challenges of the ID-transfer protocol are controlled
by the adversary. As a direct consequence, the CTP grouping-proof protocol is
also narrow-strong privacy-preserving. 1
In our protocol, each tag i has to perform two EC point multiplications to
create the output Ti,1 and Ti,2. The workload of a tag is independent of the
number of tags n involved in the protocol. Another interesting observation is
that an n-party grouping proof exactly contains 2n EC points. The bitlength
of the grouping proof is thus linearly dependent on the number of tags n. Note
however that there is a practical upper limit on the number of tags n that can
be scanned simultaneously. If n is very large, a timeout could occur in tag A
before the protocol has terminated.
4 Implementation
In order to show the feasibility of the proposed protocols for RFID tags, we an-
alyze a hardware implementation of our solutions. The EC processor we present
1 More details can be found in an extended version of this paper, see
https://www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.be/publications/.
in this paper has a novel architecture that features the most compact and at the
same time the fastest solution when compared to previous work.
The overall architecture is shown in Fig. 4. The processor consists of a micro
controller, a bus manager and an EC processor (ECP). It is connected with a
front-end module, a random number generater (RNG), ROM and RAM. The
ROM stores program codes and data that may include a tag’s private key, the
server’s public key and system parameters. The program is basically a grouping
proof for a tag or an authentication protocol.
The architecture of MALU with the required registers is shown in Fig. 3.
Here the registers in the MALU are combined with the external ones to reduce
the total number of registers.
The new ECP architecture is similar to the one presented in [3]. Further
optimizations are performed in the register file and the Modular ALU (MALU).
The EC processor presented in [3] uses a MALU which performs modular ad-
dition and multiplications, and it reuses the logic of modular multiplications
for modular squaring operations. On the other hand, the new MALU presented
here includes a specialized squarer logic. Since the modular squaring can be com-
pleted in one cycle on a dedicated squarer, the performance can be substantially
increased with an overhead of the square logic. Moreover, in the new architecture
the size of register file is reduced to 5×163 bits from 6×163 bits as we are using
ECC over GF (2163). In addition, the cost for the merged squarer is 558 gates
only.
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Fig. 3. MALU architecture with register
file.
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Fig. 4. RFID Processor Architecture.
To give an idea about the improvements for the new MALU we compared
three different versions of MALU in area. For MALU without and with a squarer
the gate counts are 913 and 1 636 gates respectively (digit size d = 1). The latter
can be improved to 1 471 when squarer and multiplier are sharing the XOR
array. Adding a squarer results in a small increase in area (for MALU) but total
area is reduced due to the reduction in the number of registers.
The performance comparison is also made with the work in [3] for the digit
size of 4 in the MALU for both architectures. This work achieves about 24%
better performance with a smaller circuit area, and the energy consumption
is much smaller. In particular, the size of our ECP processor is estimated to
14,566 kgates. We used a 0.13µm CMOS technology, and the gate area does not
include RNG, ROM and RAM which are required to store or run programmed
protocols. The area specifies a complete EC processor with required registers.
The required number of cycles for scalar multiplication is 78 544. Assuming an
operating frequency of 700KHz expected power consumption is around 11.33µW
per point multiplication. The performance result for our protocol is estimated
to 295 ms.
5 Conclusions
We presented an efficient privacy-preserving grouping-proof protocol for RFID
based solely on ECC. The protocol enables two tags to generate a proof that both
were scanned (virtually) simultaneously. The only complex operations required
from the tags are the generation of a random number and EC point multipli-
cations. We also show how to extend the protocol to multiple (n > 2) tags. In
addition, we presented a hardware architecture that demonstrates the feasibility
of the protocols even for a passive tag.
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